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Abstract—Counterfeit apps impersonate existing popular apps
in attempts to misguide users to install them for various reasons
such as collecting personal information, spreading malware, or
simply to increase their advertisement revenue. Many coun-
terfeits can be identified once installed, however even a tech-
savvy user may struggle to detect them before installation as
app icons and descriptions can be quite similar to the original
app. To this end, this paper proposes to leverage the recent
advances in deep learning methods to create image and text
embeddings so that counterfeit apps can be efficiently identified
when they are submitted to be published in app markets. We
show that for the problem of counterfeit detection, a novel
approach of combining content embeddings and style embeddings
(given by the Gram matrix of CNN feature maps) outperforms
the baseline methods for image similarity such as SIFT, SURF,
LATCH, and various image hashing methods. We first evaluate
the performance of the proposed method on two well-known
datasets for evaluating image similarity methods and show that,
content, style, and combined embeddings increase precision@k
and recall@k by 10%-15% and 12%-25%, respectively when
retrieving five nearest neighbours. Second specifically for the
app counterfeit detection problem, combined content and style
embeddings achieve 12% and 14% increase in precision@k
and recall@k, respectively compared to the baseline methods.
We also show that adding text embeddings further increases
the performance by 5% and 6% in terms of precision@k and
recall@k, respectively when k is five. Third, we present an analysis
of approximately 1.2 million apps from Google Play Store and
identify a set of potential counterfeits for top-10,000 popular
apps. Under a conservative assumption, we were able to find 2,040
potential counterfeits that contain malware in a set of 49,608 apps
that showed high similarity to one of the top-10,000 popular apps
in Google Play Store. We also find 1,565 potential counterfeits
asking for at least five additional dangerous permissions than the
original app and 1,407 potential counterfeits having at least five
extra third party advertisement libraries.
Index Terms—Security, Fraud Detection, Mobile Apps, An-
droid Security, Convolutional Neural Networks
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be
accessible
I. INTRODUCTION
Availability of third party apps is one of the major reasons
behind the wide adoption of smartphones. The two most
popular app markets, Google Play Store and Apple App Store,
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hosted approximately 2.85 million and 1.8 million apps at the
first quarter of 2020 [2], [3] and these numbers are likely
to grow further. Handling such large numbers of apps is
challenging for app market operators since there is always a
trade-off between how much scrutiny is put into checking apps
and encouraging developers by providing fast time-to-market.
As a result, problematic apps of various kinds have made it
into the app markets, including malware, before being taken
down after receiving users’ complaints [4], [5].
One category of problematic apps making into app markets
is counterfeits (i.e. apps that attempt to impersonate popular
apps). The overarching goals behind app impersonation can be
broadly categorised into two. First, developers of counterfeits
are trying to attract app installations and increase their adver-
tisement revenue. This is exacerbated by the fact that some
popular apps are not available in some countries and users
who search the names of those popular apps can become easy
targets of impersonations. Second is to use counterfeits as a
means of spreading malware. For instance, in November 2017
a fake version of the popular messenger app WhatsApp [6] was
able to get into Google Play Store and was downloaded over 1
million times before it was taken down. Similar instances were
reported in the past for popular apps such as Netflix, IFTTT,
Angry Birds [7], [8], [9], and banking apps [10]. More recently,
counterfeits have been used to secretly mine crypto currencies
in smartphones [11]. Unlike the app clones [12] that show
code level similarity, these counterfeits show no similarity in
codes and only appearance-wise similar to the original app. In
Fig. 1, we show an example counterfeit named Temple Piggy1
which shows a high visual similarity to the popular arcade
game Temple Run [13].
a) Original (Temple Run) b) Counterfeit (Temple Piggy)
Fig. 1: An example counterfeit app for the popular arcade
game Temple Run
In this paper, we propose a neural embedding-based apps
similarity detection framework that allows to identify coun-
1Temple Piggy is currently not available in Google Play Store.
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terfeit apps from a large corpus of apps represented by their
icons and text descriptions. We leverage the recent advances
in Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to generate feature
embeddings from given images using pre-trained models such
as AlexNet [14], VGGNet [15], and ResNet [16]. However,
in contrast to commonly used content embeddings generated
from fully connected layers before the last soft-max layer, we
show that combining content embeddings with style embed-
dings generated from the Gram matrix of convolutional layer
feature maps of the same pre-trained models achieve better
results in detecting visually similar app icons. Specifically,
following are the main contributions of this paper.
• We show that the novel method of using combined
style and content embeddings generated from pre-trained
CNNs outperforms many baseline image retrieval meth-
ods including hashing, feature-based, and structural sim-
ilarity based methods such as SIFT [17], SURF [18],
and SSIM [19], for the task of detecting visually sim-
ilar app icons. We also validate this method using two
standard image retrieval datasets; Holidays dataset [20]
and UKBench [21], and show that neural embeddings also
perform better than baseline hashing and feature-based
methods.
• Using a large dataset of over 1.2 million app icons, we
show that combined content and style embeddings achieve
8%–12% higher precision@k and 14%–18% higher re-
call@k when k ∈ {5, 10}.
• We show that adding text embeddings [22] generated
using the app description as an additional modality for
similarity search, further increases the performance by
3%–5% and 6%–7% in terms of precision@k and re-
call@k, respectively when k ∈ {5, 10}.
• We identify a set of 7,246 potential counterfeits (that are
similar both visually as well as functionality-wise) to the
top-10,000 popular apps in Google Play and show that
under a conservative assumption, 2,040 of them contain
malware. We further show that 1,565 potential counter-
feits ask for at least five additional dangerous permissions
than the original app and 1,407 potential counterfeits have
at least five extra third party advertisement libraries. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first large-scale study
that investigates the depth of app counterfeit problem in
app stores.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section II, we present the related work. In Section III, we
introduce our dataset followed by the methodology in Sec-
tion IV. Section V presents our results, while Section VI
discusses implications of our findings, limitations, and possible
future extensions. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Mobile Malware & Greyware
While there is a plethora of work on detecting mobile
malware [23], [24], [25], [26], [27] and various fraudulent
activities in app markets [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [5], only
a limited amount of work focused on the similarity of mobile
apps. One line of such work focused on detecting clones and
rebranding. Viennot et al. [33] used the Jaccard similarity
of app resources in the likes of images and layout XMLs to
identify clusters of similar apps and then used the developer
name and certificate information to differentiate clones from
rebranding. Crussell et al. [12] proposed to use features
generated from the source codes to identify similar apps and
then used the developer information to isolate true clones.
In contrast to above work, our work focuses on identifying
visually similar apps (i.e. counterfeits) rather than the exact
similarity (i.e. clones), which is a more challenging problem.
Limited amount of work focused on identifying visually
similar mobile apps [34], [35], [36], [37]. For example, Sun
et al. [34] proposed DroidEagle that identifies the visually
similar apps based on the LayoutTree of XML layouts of
Android apps. While the results are interesting this method
has several limitations. First, all visually similar apps may not
be necessarily similar in XML layouts and it is necessary to
consider the similarities in images. Second, app developers are
starting to use code encryption methods, thus accessing codes
and layout files may not always possible. Third, dependency of
specific aspects related to one operating system will not allow
to make comparisons between heterogeneous app markets and
in such situations only metadata and image similarity are
meaningful. Recently, Malisa et al. [37] studied how likely
would users detect a spoofing application using a complete
rendering of the application itself. To do so, authors introduced
a new metric representing the distance between the original
app screenshot and the spoofing app. In contrast to above work,
the proposed work intends to use different neural embeddings
derived from app icons and text descriptions that will better
capture visual and functional similarities.
B. Visual Similarity & Style Search
Number of work looked into the possibility of transferring
style of an image to another using neural networks. For ex-
ample, Gatys et al. [38], [39] proposed a neural style transfer
algorithm that is able to transfer the stylistic features of well-
known artworks to target images using feature representations
learned by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). Several
other methods proposed to achieve the same objective either
by updating pixels in the image iteratively or by optimising
a generative model iteratively and producing the styled image
through a single forward pass. A summary of the available
style transfer algorithms can be found in the survey by Jing
et al. [40].
Johnson et al. [41] have proposed a feed-forward network
architecture capable of real-time style transfer by solving
the optimisation problem formulated by Gatys et al. [39].
Similarly, to style transfer, CNNs have been successfully
used for image searching. In particular, Bell & Bala [42]
proposed a Siamese CNN to learn a high-quality embedding
that represent visual similarity and demonstrated the utility
of these embeddings on several visual search tasks such as
searching products across or within categories. Tan et al. [43]
and Matsuo & Yanai [44] used embeddings created from
CNNs to classify artistic styles.
This paper is an extension of our previous work [1] where
we demonstrated the feasibility of the multi-modal embed-
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dings for app counterfeit detection. In this paper we expand
our analysis further by assessing the impact of different
embeddings and pre-trained models and provide a detailed
view on multiple motivations behind app counterfeiting. To
the best of our understanding, our work is the first to show the
effectiveness of combined (multi-modal) embeddings for the
purpose of image retrieval and propose an effective solution
to leverage style embeddings. Also, our work is the first to
study the depth of the mobile counterfeit problem in Google
Play Store. We show that it is a common practice than many
would think, and often top apps are being targeted. Our
analysis shows that the majority of the counterfeits remains
in Play Store for long times before they get noticed by the
administrators and in some occasions were downloaded over
millions of times.
III. DATASET
We collected our dataset by crawling Google Play Store
using a Python crawler between January and March, 2018.
The crawler was initially seeded with the web pages of the
top free and paid apps as of January, 2018 and it recursively
discovered apps by following the links in the seeded pages and
the pages of subsequently discovered apps. Such links include
apps by the same developer and similar apps as recommended
by Google. For each app, we downloaded the metadata such
as app name, app category, app description, developer name,
and number of downloads as well as the app icon in .jpg or
.png format (of size 300 x 300 x 3 - height, width, and three
layers for RGB colour channels). The app icon is the same
icon visible in the smartphone once the app is installed and
also what users see when browsing Google Play Store.
We discovered and collected information from 1,278,297
apps during this process. For each app, we also downloaded
the app executable in APK format using Google Play Down-
loader via Command line2 tool by simulating a Google Pixel
virtual device. We were able to download APKs for 1,023,521
apps out of the total 1,278,297 apps we discovered. The main
reason behind this difference is the paid apps for which the
APK can’t be downloaded without paying. Also, there were
some apps that did not support the virtual device we used.
Finally, the APK crawler was operating in a different thread
than the main crawler as the APKs download is slower due to
their large sizes. As a result, there were some apps that were
discovered, yet by the time APK crawler reaches them they
were no longer available in Google Play Store.
Labelled set: To evaluate the performance of various image
similarity metrics we require a ground truth dataset that
contains similar images to a given image. We used a heuristic
approach to shortlist a possible set of visually similar apps and
then refined it by manual checking. Our heuristic is based on
the fact that there are apps in the app market that have multiple
legitimate versions. For example, popular game app Angry
Birds has multiple versions such as Angry Birds Rio, Angry
Birds Seasons, and Angry Birds Go. However, all these apps
are using the same characters and as such icons are similar
2https://github.com/matlink/gplaycli
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Fig. 2: Histogram of group sizes in the labelled set
Fig. 3: Example similar app groups from the labelled set
from both content (i.e. birds) and stylistic point of view (i.e.
colour and texture). Additionally, they will have similar app
descriptions as well.
Thus, we first identified the set of developers who has
published more than two apps in app store and one app has
at least 500,000 downloads. In the set of apps from the same
developer, the app with the highest number of downloads was
selected as the base app. For each other app in the set, we
then calculated the character level cosine similarity of their
app name to the base app name and selected only the apps that
had over 0.8 similarity and in the same Google Play Store app
category as the base app. Through this process we identified
2,689 groups of apps. Finally, we manually inspected each of
these groups and checked whether the group consists of actual
visually similar apps. In some occasions we found that some
groups contained apps that are not visually similar and we
discarded those.
As we describe later, during the evaluation of various image
similarity methods, the highest number of neighbours we
retrieve for each group is 20. Thus, we ensured that the
maximum number of apps in a group was 20 by removing
apps from the groups that contained more than 20 apps. To
avoid any bias, apps were picked randomly in the removal
process. At the end of this process we had 806 app groups
having a total of 3,539 apps as our labelled set. In Fig. 2 we
show the histogram of group sizes in the labelled set and in
Fig. 3 we show some example app groups from the labelled
set. The average group size of the labelled set was 4.39.
Top-10,000 popular apps: To establish a set of potential coun-
terfeits and investigate the depth of app counterfeits problem in
Google Play Store, we used top-10,000 apps since counterfeits
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majorly target popular apps. We selected top-10,000 popular
apps by sorting the apps by the number of downloads, number
of reviews, and average rating similar to what was proposed
in [45]. As we describe later in Section V, for each app in top-
10,000 we retrieved 10-nearest neighbours by icon and text
similarity and investigated those apps for malware inclusion,
dangerous permissions, and extra ad library inclusion.
Other image retrieval datasets: To benchmark the perfor-
mance of our proposed combined embeddings approach for
measuring image similarity, we use two existing ground-
truth datasets; UKBench [21] and Holidays [20]. These two
datasets are often used in benchmarking visual image retrieval
tasks [46], [47], [48]. The specific selection of UKBench and
Holidays compared to other image retrieval datasets such as
Oxford5k [49], Paris6k [50], and Sculptures6k [51] was based
on the fact that these two datasets have a closer average of
results per query image to our labelled set (i.e. approximately
3-4 images per query image). Other datasets have much higher
values in the range of hundreds.
UKBench dataset contains 10,200 images from 2,550
groups. In each group, there are four images taken on the
same object from different angles and illumination conditions.
In Holidays dataset, there are 1,491 images from 500 groups
and each group contains three images on average. The images
in each group are taken on a scene with various viewpoints.
In both datasets, the first image of each group is taken as the
query image to retrieve the nearest neighbours.
IV. METHODOLOGY
As mentioned before, the main problem we are trying to
address is that “given an app can we find potential counterfeits
from a large corpus of apps?”. Since counterfeit apps focus
more on being visually similar to the apps they are trying to
impersonate, we mainly focus on finding similar app icons to
a given app icon. We also focus on the similarity between text
as an additional modality to calculate similarity between apps.
We emphasise again that the objective of this work is not to
identify app clones or hijacked versions of apps that will show
strong similarities in code level.
Our proposed methodology consists of two high level steps.
In the first step, we represent the apps with three types
of neural embeddings and their combinations; content, style,
and text. In the second step, given an app icon, we retrieve
nearest neighbours calculated based on distances between
different embeddings with the expectation that if there are any
counterfeits to the query app, those will be retrieved in the
nearest neighbour search.
For the rest of this section, we discuss details of the app
embedding generation and how we do the nearest neighbour
search for various scenarios (cf. Section IV-A, Section IV-B,
and Section IV-C). At the end of the section, we describe the
baseline methods we use to compare the performance of our
proposed method (cf. Section IV-D).
A. App Icon Embeddings
We encode the original app icon image of size 300×300×3
to a lower dimension for efficient search as well as to avoid
false positives happening at large dimensions [52]. We create
two types of low dimensional neural representations of the
images. For this we use a pre-trained VGG19 [15]; a state-of-
the-art CNN that is trained on ImageNet dataset [53]. VGG19
consists of five convolutional blocks followed by two fully
connected layers. All convolutional layers use 3x3 kernels
as the receptive field and convolution stride is fixed to 1
to preserve spatial resolution after convolution. The numbers
of filters used in the five blocks are 64, 128, 256, 512,
and 512 respectively. Each block has multiple convolutional
layers followed by a max pooling layer which reduces the
dimensions of the input. The two fully connected layers consist
of 4,096 neurons and followed by the prediction layer with
1,000 classes. All layers use ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit)
activations while the prediction layer uses softmax activation.
i) Content embeddings: To extract the content representations,
we fed all 1.2M app icons to the VGG19, and used the content
embeddings, C ∈ R4096, generated at the last fully connected
layer of VGG19 (usually called as the fc_7 layer) that have
shown good results in the past [54], [42].
ii) Style embeddings: As mentioned in Section I, content
similarity itself is not sufficient for counterfeit detection since
sometimes developers keep the visual similarity and change
the content. For example, if a developer is trying to create a
fake app for a popular game that has birds as characters, she
can create a game that has the same visual “look and feel” and
replace birds with cats. Therefore, we require an embedding
that represents the style of an image.
Several work demonstrated that the filter responses (also
known as feature maps) of convolutional neural networks
can be used to represent the style of an image [39], [55].
For example, Gayts et al. [39] used pre-trained convolutional
neural networks to transfer the style characteristics of an
arbitrary source image to an arbitrary target image. This was
done by defining an objective function which captures the
content loss and the style loss. To represent the style of an
image, authors used the Gram matrix of the filter responses
of the convolution layers. We followed a similar approach and
used the fifth convolution layer (specifically conv5_1) of the
VGG19 to obtain the style representation of the image, as
previous comparable work indicated that conv5_1 provides
better performance in classifying artistic styles [44]. In the
process of getting the embeddings for icons, each icon is
passed through the VGGNet, and at conv5_1 the icon is
convolved with pre-trained filters and activated through ReLU
activation function.
More specifically, for an image I , let F l ∈ RNl×Ml be
the filter response of layer l, where Nl denotes the number
of filters in layer l and Ml is the height times width of the
feature map. F lij is the activation of i
th filter at position j in
the layer l.
Similar to Gayts et al. [39], to capture style information we
use the correlations of the activations calculated by the dot
product. That is, for a given image I , let Gl ∈ RNl×Nl be the
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dot product Gram matrix at layer l, i.e.
Glij =
Ml∑
k=1
F likF
l
jk, (1)
where F l ∈ RNl×Ml is the activation of I . Then, Gl is used as
the style representation of an image to retrieve similar images.
The conv5_1− layer of the VGGNet we use has 512 filters,
thus the resulting Gram matrix is of size G5 ∈ R512×512.
Gram matrix is symmetric as it represents the correlations
between the filter outputs. Therefore, we only consider the
upper triangular portion and the diagonal of the Gram matrix
as our style representation vector, S ∈ R131,328. Though this
reduces the dimension of the style vector by about half, the
style embedding dimension is much larger compared to the
content embeddings, C ∈ R4,096. Thus, to further reduce
the dimension of style embeddings we used the very sparse
random projection [56]. We selected sparse random projection
over other dimensionality reduction methods such as PCA and
t-SNE due to its computational efficiency [57].
More specifically, let A ∈ Rn×D be our style matrix that
contains the style embeddings of a mini batch of n (in the
experiments we used n=20,000) icons stacked vertically, and
D is the dimension of the style vector, which in this case is
131, 328. Then, we create a sparse random matrix R ∈ RD×k
and multiply it with A. The elements rij of R are drawn
according to the below distribution,
rij =
4
√
D

1, with prob. 1
2
√
D
0, with prob. 1− 1√
D
−1, with prob. 1
2
√
D
(2)
At large dimensions,R becomes sparse as the probability of
getting a zero is increasing with D. Since sparse matrices are
almost orthogonal [58], [59], multiplication with R, projects
A in another orthogonal dimension.
B =
1√
k
AR ∈ Rn×k (3)
Each row of B gives a dimensionality reduced vector S′ ∈
Rk and in our case we used k = 4, 096 to ensure the size of
style embeddings matches the size of the content embeddings.
The VGG19 architecture has four layers in the fifth con-
volutional block. Although we use conv5_1 for main results
of the paper, we also did a comparison of the performance of
all the four layers in block 5 of VGG19. To check the effect
of the pre-trained network architecture, we conducted similar
experiments with VGG16 and ResNet50 as well. Additionally,
we transform the Gram matrix feature space into different
kernel-spaces [60], [61] and evaluate the performance. These
methods provide extra hyper parameters of the kernel to
constrain the metric space. However, we found that almost
all these kernel spaces preform similar to the feature space.
We present these results in Appendix A and Appendix B
respectively.
B. Text Embeddings
The app descriptions from Google Play Store can contain a
maximum of 4000 characters, where the developer describes
the apps functionalities and features to the potential users.
As such, counterfeits are likely to show some similarities to
original apps’ description. To capture this similarity, we first
pre-processed the app descriptions using standard text pre-
processing methods such as tokenising, converting to lower
case, removing stop words, and then trained a Distributed
Memory Model of Paragraph Vectors (PV-DM) [22] that
created vectors of size 100 to represent each app by training
the model over 1,000 epochs. Note that due to the character
limitation of 4,000 in text descriptions, we can not create
embeddings as large as content and style vectors.
C. Retrieving Similar Apps
During the similar app retrieval process we take an app and
calculated the required embeddings and search in the encoded
space for k nearest neighbours using cosine distance.3 Let Xyi
be a vectored representation of an app i using the encoding
scheme y (image or text) and Xyt be the corresponding
representation of the target app we are comparing, we calculate
the different distance metrics for different representations as
summarised in the first row of Table I. Note that both Xyi and
Xyt are vectors of size n (i.e. X
y
i = < x
y
1, x
y
2, ..., x
y
n >). We
used different k values to evaluate our method as we discuss
later in Section V.
D. Baseline Methods
We compare the performance of our method with several
baseline methods. Specifically, we use state-of-the-art image
hashing methods, feature-based image retrieval methods, and
SSIM (Structural Similarity). We next describe how each
method is used in our setting.
i) Hashing methods: Hashing methods we evaluate in this
paper include average [63], difference [64], perceptual [65],
and wavelet [66] hashing. All four methods scale the input
app icon into a gray-scale 32 × 32 image first and represent
the image as a 1024 dimensional binary feature vector so
that it can easily compute the similarity score using hamming
distance. Average hash computes a binary vector based on
whether pixels’ values are greater than the average colour
of the image. Difference hash tracks the gradients of the
image and perceptual hash evaluates the frequency patterns
using discrete cosine transform to generate a binary vector.
Wavelet hashing also works in frequency domain, and it
calculates a vector using discrete wavelet transformation. Since
hashing methods result in binary image representations we use
hamming distance as the distance metric.
ii) Feature-based image retrieval methods: Feature-based
image retrieval methods extract features from an image which
are invariant to scale and rotation, and describe them using
their neighbouring pixels. Thus, feature-based image retrieval
3We also tried the L2 distance in our previous work [62]. However, it
always resulted lower performance compared to the cosine distance.
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Fig. 4: Summary of the image encoding/embeddings generation methodology
has two steps; feature detection and feature description. Some
algorithms perform both tasks together while others perform
them separately. In this paper, we use four feature match-
ing methods; Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [17],
Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF) [18], Accelerated KAZE
(AKAZE) [67], and Learned Arrangements of Three Patch
Codes (LATCH) [68]. SIFT, SURF, and AKAZE perform both
feature detection and description. However, LATCH performs
only the feature description task, thus SIFT feature detector
is used in LATCH algorithm. SIFT and SURF describe the
app icon by a fi × 128 integer descriptor matrix, where fi
is the number of features detected for app icon i. AKAZE
and LATCH describe the app icon by a fi × 64 binary
descriptor matrix. After representing all 1.2 million apps by
a feature descriptor, feature matching is performed using
euclidean distance for integer descriptors (SIFT and SURF)
and hamming distance for binary descriptors (AKAZE and
LATCH).
In feature-based methods, the image vector size n depends
on the number of features (fyi ) detected for app icon i by
each method and thus n is not a constant value. Moreover, the
distance calculation between the base app i and the target app t
is carried out in two steps. First, the closest feature pair for all
fyi features among f
y
t features is selected using L2/hamming
distance between the feature descriptors xyi and x
y
t . Then the
total distance is calculated as the sum of the distances between
all feature descriptors xyi and its closest pair.
iii) Structural Similarity Index Matrix (SSIM): SSIM [19]
compares the local pattern of pixel intensities in two images
and calculate a similarity score. This method gives a high
similarity score even for images with significant pixel-wise
difference as it does not compare images point-by-point basis.
SSIM does not represent an image by a vector/matrix, thus the
whole image is required every comparison. This is one of the
drawbacks in SSIM. Therefore, we scale the input app icons
into a gray-scale 32 × 32 images and calculate the similarity
score using SSIM.
In Fig. 4, we show an overview of our icon encoding
process and in Table I we show a summary of all the different
TABLE I: Summary of different encoding methods and cor-
responding distance metrics
Encoding
Method
Size (n) Distance function
Neural embeddings (Cosine distance)
Content (Ccos) 4,096 1− X
cont
i .X
cont
t
||Xconti ||2||Xcontt ||2
Style (Scos) 4,096 1− X
style
i .X
style
t
||Xstylei ||2||X
style
t ||2
Text (Tcos) 100 1− X
text
i .X
text
t
||Xtexti ||2||Xtextt ||2
α Content+β Style 8,192 α Ccos + β Scos
α Content+β Style 8,292 α Ccos + β Scos + γ Tcos
+γ Text
Hashing methods (Hamming distance)
Average 1,024 ||Xavgi ⊕Xavgt ||1
Difference 1,024 ||Xdiffi ⊕Xdifft ||1
Perceptual 1,024 ||Xperci ⊕Xperct ||1
Wavelet 1,024 ||Xwavei ⊕Xwavet ||1
Feature based methods (L2 distance)
SIFT fsifti × 128
∑
xi∈Xi
min
xt∈Xt
[||xsifti − xsiftt ||2]
SURF fsurfi ×128
∑
xi∈Xi
min
xt∈Xt
[||xsurfi − xsurft ||2]
Feature based methods (Hamming distance)
AKAZE fakazei × 64
∑
xi∈Xi
min
xt∈Xt
[||xakazei ⊕
xakazet ||2]
LATCH f latchi × 64
∑
xi∈Xi
min
xt∈Xt
[||xlatchi ⊕xlatcht ||2]
Structural similarity
SSIM Directly returns a dissimilarity value be-
tween 0 and 1
embeddings/encoding methods and the distance metrics we
used including the baselines.
V. RESULTS
A. Evaluation of Embeddings
To quantify the performance of the different encodings
and the proposed multi-modal embeddings, we evaluate them
in four different test scenarios using multiple datasets. In
each scenario, for a given query encoding/embedding, we
retrieved k-nearest neighbours (k-NN) based on the distances
considered in Table I. We tested four values of k; 5, 10, 15,
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and 20. The four scenarios are:
i) Holidays dataset: As mentioned before, the Holidays
dataset contains 1,491 images from 500 groups. We took the
encoded representation of the first image from each group as
the query to search the entire corpus and retrieved the k-nearest
neighbours.
ii) UKBench dataset: UKBench dataset contains 10,200
images from 2,550 groups. The encoding of the first image
in each group was taken as the query to retrieve the k-nearest
neighbours from the entire dataset.
iii) Apps - Labelled set only: Our labelled set contains 3,539
images from 806 groups. From each group, the base app icon
embedding (cf. Section III) was taken as the query to retrieve
the k-nearest icons by searching through the remaining 3,538
icons.
iv) Apps - Labelled set and all remaining icons and text:
This dataset contains 1.2M images including the images in
the labelled set. The embedding of the base app icon of each
group in the labelled set was taken as the query to search
the entire image set and retrieve the k-nearest neighbours. For
the last distance metric that contained text, we used the text
embeddings generated for all 1.2M app descriptions using the
method described in Section IV-B, in addition to the image
based content and style embeddings.
The intuition behind above test scenarios is that if the encod-
ing/embedding is a good representation of the image (or text),
the k-nearest neighbours we retrieve must be from the same
group as the query image (or text). Thus, for each scenario, we
present precision@k and recall@k, where k ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20},
as the performance metrics. Precision@k gives the percentage
of relevant images among the retrieved images as defined in
(4). Recall@k is the percentage of relevant images that have
been retrieved out of the all relevant images as defined in (5).
For the last distance metric in Table I, we considered the base
app itself as the querying item (represented by both image and
text embeddings).
precision@k =
| {relevant images} ∩ {retrieved images} |
| {retrieved images} | ∗ 100%
(4)
recall@k =
| {relevant images} ∩ {retrieved images} |
| {relevant images} | ∗100% (5)
We present precision@k and recall@k values for all four
test scenarios in Table II and Table III, respectively. To choose
the best β and γ values in multi-modals neural embeddings,
we varied β and γ from 1 to 10 with an interval of one. We
achieved the best results when β = 5 and γ = 4 and we report
those results in Tables II and III. The main takeaway messages
from results in these two tables can be summarised as below.
• In all four datasets, neural embedding methods outper-
form hashing and feature-based methods. For example,
for all four k-NN scenarios, the style embeddings have
approximately 4%–14% and 11%–26% higher perfor-
mance in precision@k and recall@k in all apps dataset
compared to hashing and feature-based baseline methods.
• In UKBench and Holidays datasets, content, style, and
combined embeddings increase precision@k and re-
call@k by 10%–15% and 12%–25%, respectively when
retrieving five nearest neighbours. Combining style em-
beddings with content embeddings achieves 12% higher
precision@k and 14% higher recall@k in all app dataset
compared to hashing and feature-based baselines when
k = 5. Only scenario where combined content and
style embeddings did not outperform all other methods is
the UKBench dataset. A possible reason for this is that
UKBench dataset contains images that are similar to the
ImageNet dataset used to pre-train the VGGNet.
• It is also noticeable that adding text embedding further in-
creases the performance by 3%-5% and 6%-7% in terms
of precision@k and recall@k, respectively, compared to
the best neural embedding method when k ∈ {5, 10}.
This method is not applicable for UKBench and Holidays
datasets as there are no associated text descriptions for
those images.
• Results also show that increasing the k value in top-k
scenarios increases the recall@k, however, significantly
decreases precision@k. The main reason is that average
number of images per groups in all four datasets is less
than 5 and thus the number of false positive images in
the retrieved image set increases when k increases.
To elaborate further on the performance of the embeddings
qualitatively, in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we present the 10-nearest
neighbours we retrieved using difference hashing, feature-
based methods, and different neural embeddings for the top-
10 most popular apps in Google Play Store. In most of the
cases, the methods presented in Fig. 5 do not identify visually
similar apps apart from the first 1-2 similar apps (E.g. row 9
- Google Maps). We can also observe that if the orientations
of the two images are similar, hashing and SSIM methods are
able to retrieve the images (E.g. row 3 - Whats app and row
7 - Skype). Neural embeddings based methods in Fig. 6 have
identified better fits in several cases (E.g. row 1 - Google Play
Services and row 9 - Google Maps).
In particular, in Fig. 6-(b) style embeddings have retrieved
app icons that have the same “look and feel” in terms of
colour (e.g. Facebook Messenger in row 5). The improvement
provided by combining text embeddings is visible in some
of the cases in Fig. 6-(d). For instance, Skype in row 7 and
YouTube in row 6.
We also experimented the performance of style embeddings
generated from other convolutional layers of VGG19 and
layers from VGG16, and ResNet50. We used layers in the
fifth convolution block of each architecture for the experiment
as deeper layers have proven to perform better in representing
the style of an image. We found out that although there are
variations among different individual layers, all three architec-
tures perform in a similar manner. For clarity we discuss these
results in Appendix A. Additionally, we also experimented
with projecting style embeddings into different kernel spaces.
This allows us to model the different characteristics of the
metric space, which cannot be captured in the feature space.
Subsequently, we project the feature space embeddings into
Squared exponential kernel, and polynomial kernel, and we
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γT
co
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5-NN 24.56 22.68 21.60 24.48 33.00 31.12 29.16 31.00 21.88 46.36 46.72 47.92 N/A
10-NN 13.08 11.74 10.96 12.98 17.58 16.66 15.18 15.90 11.26 25.28 25.24 25.92 N/A
15-NN 9.00 8.08 7.36 8.92 12.15 11.55 10.43 10.91 7.76 17.47 17.25 17.89 N/A
H
ol
id
ay
s
20-NN 6.95 6.19 5.58 6.83 9.34 8.91 7.99 8.31 5.98 13.31 13.13 13.57 N/A
5-NN 27.29 22.44 21.63 26.37 55.27 52.97 44.82 41.77 28.46 70.22 65.02 70.06 N/A
10-NN 15.01 11.70 10.97 14.26 28.99 27.93 23.72 21.98 15.22 36.90 33.86 36.62 N/A
15-NN 10.51 7.95 7.38 9.99 19.82 19.12 16.22 15.04 10.55 25.03 22.95 24.79 N/A
U
K
B
en
ch
20-NN 8.18 6.08 5.59 7.75 15.11 14.60 12.37 11.47 8.17 18.97 17.40 18.75 N/A
5-NN 45.14 48.41 47.62 44.44 48.92 47.67 46.63 44.22 45.34 56.43 60.57 62.23 64.76
10-NN 23.98 28.10 27.42 25.50 26.79 27.05 26.34 25.07 25.59 33.69 35.84 36.04 38.47
15-NN 18.59 19.92 19.45 18.08 18.86 19.00 18.45 17.54 18.06 24.05 25.45 25.57 27.19
L
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d
20-NN 14.52 15.56 15.24 14.16 14.57 14.69 14.24 13.5 14.09 18.69 19.75 19.86 21.09
5-NN 34.89 38.01 37.07 34.17 38.23 39.13 37.32 36.87 37.39 45.66 50.67 50.91 55.96
10-NN 19.43 21.53 20.79 19.08 21.82 22.10 21.09 20.81 20.73 26.08 29.65 29.81 32.99
A
ll
15-NN 13.69 15.30 14.74 13.32 15.31 15.52 14.82 14.63 14.47 18.35 21.00 21.12 23.46
20-NN 10.63 11.89 11.40 10.36 11.87 11.97 11.46 11.33 11.15 14.18 16.15 16.31 18.23
TABLE II: precision@k for all test scenarios (NN* - Nearest Neighbours)
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5-NN 41.18 38.03 36.22 41.05 55.33 52.18 48.89 51.98 36.69 77.73 78.34 80.35 N/A
10-NN 43.86 39.37 36.75 43.53 58.95 55.87 50.91 53.32 37.76 84.78 84.64 86.92 N/A
15-NN 45.27 40.64 37.02 44.87 61.10 58.08 52.45 54.86 39.03 87.86 86.79 90.01 N/A
H
ol
id
ay
s
20-NN 46.61 41.52 37.42 45.81 62.64 59.76 53.59 55.73 40.11 89.27 88.06 91.01 N/A
5-NN 34.11 28.05 27.04 32.96 69.09 66.22 56.03 52.23 35.58 87.78 81.27 87.58 N/A
10-NN 37.51 29.25 27.42 35.66 72.47 69.84 59.3 54.96 38.03 92.25 84.65 91.54 N/A
15-NN 39.41 29.82 27.69 37.46 74.34 71.69 60.83 56.4 39.56 93.85 86.08 92.96 N/A
U
K
B
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ch
20-NN 40.92 30.82 27.93 38.73 75.57 72.99 61.83 57.34 40.86 94.83 86.98 93.75 N/A
5-NN 51.40 55.35 54.22 50.61 55.43 54.28 53.09 50.35 51.60 64.26 68.97 69.82 73.75
10-NN 59.17 64.08 62.44 58.07 61.00 61.60 59.99 57.11 58.24 76.72 81.63 82.09 87.62
15-NN 63.49 68.04 66.46 61.77 64.42 64.91 63.04 59.93 61.66 82.17 86.95 87.34 92.88
L
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d
20-NN 66.12 70.90 69.40 64.48 66.37 66.91 64.88 61.51 64.12 85.14 89.94 90.45 96.07
5-NN 39.73 42.29 42.22 38.91 43.29 44.30 42.47 41.96 42.55 51.99 57.70 57.98 63.72
10-NN 44.25 49.03 47.36 43.46 49.42 50.04 48.01 47.36 47.19 59.40 67.53 67.90 75.13
A
ll
15-NN 46.76 52.27 50.35 45.49 52.02 52.73 50.61 49.93 49.39 62.70 71.74 72.14 80.16
20-NN 48.43 54.14 51.94 47.19 53.75 54.23 52.16 51.57 50.75 64.59 73.58 74.29 83.05
TABLE III: recall@k for all test scenarios (NN* - Nearest Neighbours)
also shift the features by a fixed bias to move the embeddings
in the feature space. However, there is no significant gain in
the model performance with kernel space embeddings. There
results are presented in Appendix B.
B. Retrieving Potential Counterfeits
We next use the embeddings that performed best (Contentcos
+ βStylecos + γTextcos where β = 5 and γ = 4) to retrieve
similar apps for top-10,000 popular apps and check the
availability of malware, as spreading malware can be one of
the main objectives behind publishing counterfeit apps. In this
analysis, we focus only on the popular apps since they usually
are the main targets of counterfeits. For each app in the top-
10,000 popular apps we retrieved 10-nearest neighbours apps
(in terms of both visual and text similarity) from the corpus
of 1.2 million apps that are not from the same developer.
However, the 10-nearest neighbour search is forced to return
10 nearest apps, irrespective of the distance. As such, there can
be cases where the nearest neighbour search returns apps that
are very far from the query app. Thus, we applied a distance
threshold to further narrow down the retrieved results. From
the retrieved 10 results for each query app, we discarded the
results that are having distances greater than a empirically
decided threshold. The threshold was chosen as the knee-
point [69] of the cumulative distribution of all the distances
with the original apps as shown in Fig. 7. The exact value of
threshold is 2.92. Note that the maximum distance that can
occur for the embedding we consider; Contentcos + βStylecos
+ γTextcos is 10 since the maximum value of cosine distance
is one. It is possible to further lower this distance threshold
and have more conservative retrievals with high precision or
increase this threshold and reach a high recall. This is a
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Fig. 5: 10-Nearest neighbours of the top-10 popular apps
(hashing, feature-based, and structural similarity methods)
Fig. 6: 10-Nearest neighbours of the top-10 popular apps
(neural embeddings)
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Fig. 7: Cumulative number of apps against the multi-modal
embeddings based distance
Fig. 8: Graph-based visualisation of top-100 apps and similar
app icons (small clusters in this figure do not contain apps
from the same developer)
decision at the hand of the app market operators depending on
the effort they want to put into further scrutinise the possible
counterfeits.
This process returned 60,638 unique apps that are poten-
tially counterfeits of one or more apps with in top-10,000
popular apps. Out of this 60,638 we had APK files for 49,608
apps. In Fig. 8, we show a graph-based visualisation of the
app icons of potential counterfeits we identified for top-100
popular apps. The centre node of each small cluster represent
an app in top-100 and the connected apps to that are the similar
apps we identified for that particular app. As the figure shows,
many of the similar apps retrieved show high visual similarity
to the original app.
C. Malware Analysis
We then checked each of the 49,608 potential counterfeits
using the private API of the online malware analysis tool
VirusTotal.4 VirusTotal scans the APKs with over 60 com-
4https://www.virustotal.com
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Fig. 9: Number of apps against the number of reporting AV-
tools in VirusTotal
mercial anti-virus tools (AV-tools) in the likes of AVG, Avast,
Microsoft, BitDefender, Kaspersky, and McAfee and provides
a report on how many of those tools identified whether the
submitted APKs contain malware. We used the private API of
VirusTotal because there is a rate (4 requests per minute) and
size (32 MB) limitations of the number of binaries that can
be analysed using the public API.
In Fig. 9, we show a summarised view of the number of
apps that were tagged for possible inclusion of malware by one
or more AV-tools in VirusTotal and their availability in Google
Play Store as of 24-10-2018. As the figure shows, there are
7,246 APKs that are tagged by at least one of the AV-tool.
However, there can be false positives and as such a single
AV-tool tagging an APK as malware in VirusTotal may not
necessarily mean that the APK contains malware. As a result,
previous work used different thresholds for the number of AV-
tools that must report to consider an APK as malware. Ikram et
al. [70] used a conservative threshold of 5 and Arp et al. [71]
used a more relaxed threshold of 2. Fig. 9 shows that we have
3,907 apps if the AV-tool threshold is 2 and 2,040 apps if the
threshold is 5, out of which 2,067 and 1,080 apps respectively,
are still there in Google Play Store. Approximately 46% of
the apps (3,358) that were tagged by at least one AV-tool are
currently not available in Google Play Store. One possible
reason is that Google at some point decided to remove those
apps from the Play Store after receiving customer complaints
or after post app publication binary analysis.
In Table IV, we show some example apps that were tagged
as containing malware, corresponding original apps, and their
number of downloads. The table shows that while the coun-
terfeit does not attract as large numbers of downloads as the
original app in some occasions they have been downloaded
significant number of times (e.g. Temple Theft Run has been
downloaded at least 500,000 times.).
D. Permission Requests
In addition to spreading malware, there can be other mo-
tivations for developing counterfeits. One such motivation
can be collecting user’s personal data by misleading them
to install the counterfeit and requesting to grant dangerous
TABLE IV: Example similar apps that contain malware
Original
app
Similar
app
AV
tools
Downloads
(Original)
Downloads
(Similar)
Clean Master Ram Booster* 12
500 million
- 1 billion
500
- 1,000
Temple Run Endless Run* 12
100 million
- 500 million
5,000
- 10,000
Temple Run 2 Temple TheftRun* 12
500 million
- 1 billion
500,000
- 1 million
Hill Climb
Racing
Offroad Racing:
Mountain Climb 9
100 million
- 500 million
1 million
- 5 million
Flow Free Colored Pipes 8
100 million
- 500 million
1 million
- 5 million
Parallel Space Double Account* 17
50 million
- 100 million
100,000
- 500,000
* The app is currently not available in Google Play Store
TABLE V: Example similar apps with high permission differ-
ence
Original app Similar app #PD Downloads
(Original)
Downloads
(Similar)
7 Minutes
Workout
7 Minute
Workout VGFIT 6
10 million
- 50 million
5,000
- 10,000
Language
Translator
Multi Language
Translator Free 9
5 million
- 10 million
100,000
- 500,000
Phone Clean
Speed Booster
Lemon
Cleaner* 12
1 million
- 5 million
10,000
- 50,000
Color Torch HD
LED flash light
Flashlight
Messenger* 12
50 million
- 100 million
1,000
- 5,000
Farm Paradise:
Hay Island Bay
Summer
Tales 23
1 million
- 5 million
50,000
- 100,000
Mp3 Music
Download
Colorful Music
Player* 5
5 million
- 10 million
100,000
- 500,000
* The app is currently not available in Google Play Store
#PD - Number of Permission differences
TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 20XX 11
Android permissions. To investigate this, we considered the
26 dangerous permissions listed in the Android developer
documentation [72]. To identify the potential counterfeits that
ask for more permissions than the original app, we define
a metric, permissions difference, which is the difference
between the number of dangerous permissions requested by
the potential counterfeit but not the original app and number
of dangerous permissions requested by the original app but not
by the potential counterfeit app. If the permissions difference
is a positive value that means the potential counterfeit asks
for more dangerous permissions than the original app and vice
versa if the permissions difference is negative. For the 49,608
potential counterfeits we had the APK files, we calculated the
permission difference. The permissions were extracted by the
decompiling the APK and parsing the Android Manifest file.
The cumulative sum of number of apps against the permis-
sion difference is shown in Figure 10a. The value of permission
difference can vary from -26, where the counterfeit does
not ask for any dangerous permission whereas the original
app asks for all the dangerous permissions, to 26 for the
opposite. Also, note that in this graph we have data for 62,074
apps instead of the 49,608 unique apps, because some apps
were retrieved as counterfeits to more than one app in top-
10,000 popular apps giving multiples values for permission
difference. According to the figure, the majority of the poten-
tial counterfeits did not ask for more dangerous permissions
than the original app. However, still there is 17,230 potential
counterfeits that are asking at least one dangerous permission
than the corresponding original app (13,857 unique apps), and
1,866 potential counterfeits (1,565 unique apps) asking at least
five additional dangerous permissions compared to the original
apps.
In Table V we show some example such apps and in
Figure 10b we show Google Play Store availability of the
17,230 apps that were asking for more dangerous permis-
sions than the original app as of 24-10-2018. As the figure
shows approximately 37% of the potential counterfeits with
a permission difference of five is currently not available in
the Google Play Store. Overall approximately 27% of the
apps with a positive permission difference are currently not
available in Google Play Store. Again we conjecture these
removals are done by Google after user complaints or post
publication analysis.
E. Advertisement Libraries
Another motivation behind developing counterfeits can be
monetisation using third party advertisements and analytics.
To quantify this, for each of the potential counterfeit we
retrieved, we defined a metric; ad library difference using the
list of 124 mobile advertising and analytics libraries complied
by Seneviratne et al. [73]. Similar to previously calculated
permission difference, ad library difference is the difference
between the number of advertisement libraries embedded in
the potential counterfeit but not in the original app and number
of advertisement libraries embedded in the original app but not
in the potential counterfeit app. A positive value of ad library
difference means that the potential counterfeit has some extra
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Fig. 10: Potential counterfeits requesting additional dangerous
permissions
ad libraries included compared to the original app. We show
the cumulative number of potential counterfeits over the range
of ad library difference in Figure 11a. According to the figure,
13,997 apps (11,281 unique apps) have a positive ad library
difference and out of that 1,841 (1,407 unique apps) have an
ad library difference greater than or equal to five. Figure 11b
shows the Google Play store availability of apps with a positive
ad library difference. Overall, approximately 33% of the apps
we identified are currently not available in the Google Play
Store.
VI. DISCUSSION
Using a large dataset of over 1.2 million app icons and
over 1 million app executables, in this paper we presented
insights of the app counterfeit problem in mobile app markets.
The objective of the proposed embeddings-based method is
to quickly and automatically assess a new submission and
decide whether it resembles an existing app. If the new app is
visually similar to an existing app, the app market operator can
decide to do further security checks that can potentially include
dynamic analysis as well as manual checks. We next discuss
the limitations of our work and possible future extensions.
A. Limitations
Establishing a ground truth dataset for this type of problem
is challenging due to several reasons. In this work, to build the
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TABLE VI: Example similar apps with high ad library differ-
ence
Original
app
Similar
app
#AD Downloads
(Original)
Downloads
(Similar)
Temple Run Endless Run* 6
100 million
- 500 million
5,000
- 10,000
Temple Run Temple escape* 9
100 million
- 500 million
50,000
- 100,000
Sound
Meter
Smart Sound
Meter 6
5 million
- 10 million
1,000
- 5000
Dentist
games
Dr. Dentist
Little* 8
5 million
- 10 million
100,000
- 500,000
Deer Hunter
Classic
Sniper Deer
Hunting* 8
50 million
- 100 million
1,000
- 5,000
Torch
Flashlight
Flashlight
Plus 5
10 million
-50 million
10,000
- 50,000
* The app is currently not available in Google Play Store
#AD - Number of Ad library difference
ground truth dataset we used a heuristic approach to shortlist
groups of apps that can potentially show visual similarities
and then refine the dataset by manual inspection. However, as
described in Section V, there is a possibility that the unlabelled
portion of data can still contain better similar apps than the
labelled set and such apps can be returned during the nearest
neighbour search instead of the target apps. This will result
in a lower performance in terms of recall; yet in reality
received images also show high visual similarity. One possible
solution for this is to use crowdsourcing to directly evaluate
the performance of the embeddings without using a labelled
dataset. For instance, retrieved images can be shown to a set
of reviewers together with the original image and ask them to
assign values for similarity with the original image. Then these
values can be aggregated to come up with an overall score
for the performance of the embedding. Crowdsourcing will
also alleviate any biases introduced by individuals as visually
similarity of images in some occasions can be subjective.
B. Adversarial Attacks
Many neural networks, especially CNN-based image clas-
sification systems are known to be prone to adversarial ex-
amples, i.e. curated inputs that can mislead the classifier to
make a wrong decision [74], [75]. In the context of image
retrieval systems, an adversarial example is a query image
that will retrieve irrelevant images. Since our work is based
on an undefended pre-trained convolutional neural network, it
20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15
Ad library difference
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
nu
m
be
r 
 o
f p
ot
en
tia
l c
ou
nt
er
fe
its
(a) Cumulative number of apps against ad library difference
1 5 10 15
Ad library difference
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
No
. o
f a
pp
s
Still in Google Play
Removed from Google Play
(b) Play Store availability of apps with positive ad library difference
Fig. 11: Potential counterfeits with additional third party
advertisement libraries
is likely that an attacker can build adversarial examples that
can bypass our similarity search and retrieve a set of unrelated
images allowing the counterfeit apps to sustain in the app
market. Multiple studies have demonstrated the feasibility of
such attacks against image retrieval systems [76], [77], [78].
Also, we highlight that the vulnerability to adversarial
attacks is not limited to deep learning based methods. Image
retrieval systems based on traditional methods such as SIFT
are also shown to be vulnerable to such attacks [79], [80].
Due to the multi-modal nature of our approach, an attacker
might be able to curate images or text that can show high
similarity in lower weighted modalities and bypass our system,
yet appear as a real app to the user. It is an interesting future
research direction to evaluate the robustness of our method
to different adversarial attacks and integrate some defense
mechanisms such as defensive distillation [81] or projected
gradient descent [82] based methods. Also, to alleviate attacks
that might rely on the relative balance of the weights of
different modalities an ensemble of distance metrics can be
considered with randomly perturbed weights.
C. Identifying Counterfeits
Our evaluation of the retrieved set of highly visually similar
apps was limited to the apps that possibly contain malware.
Nonetheless, there can be counterfeits that do not contain
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malware and sometimes it can be difficult to automatically
decide whether a given app is counterfeit or not. In Fig. 12 we
show some examples we retrieved that showed high visually
similarity to one of the apps in top-1,000 yet did not contain
malware or showed a significant difference in permissions or
ad libraries. For instance, in Fig. 12-(a) we show two visually
similar apps we retrieved for the popular game Words with
Friends.
Fig. 12: Some example apps that showed high visual similarity
to one of the apps in top-10,000, yet did not contain any
malware
One possible approach is to focus on apps that shows high
visual and text similarity and high discrepancy in number
of downloads. However, this is still not a straight forward
decision. Firstly, there can be legitimate reasons for apps to
be similar, at least in some modalities (e.g. generic apps such
as messenger, flashlight, or phone). Moreover, developers can
have multiple publishing profiles. If new apps were immedi-
ately counterfeited, the counterfeits can surpass the organic
downloads using fake downloads [83]. As a result, to detect
counterfeits that does show any malware behaviours or privacy
violations, some other factors such as app functionality and
description need to be considered.
For such scenarios, instead of the using only the similarity
in app icons, the overall similarity of all the images available
in Google Play Store pertaining to the two apps can be
considered. This is because a developer can make the icons
slightly different from the original app, and yet have the
same visual “look and feel” inside the app. Also, a number
of work highlighted that apps can be clustered based on
functional similarity using text mining methods [84], [31].
Combining such methods with state-of-art techniques such
as word vectors and document vectors [85], [22] and using
them in conjunction with image similarity can further improve
results. Nonetheless, for some cases still a manual intervention
may be required. For example, in above case of Words with
Friends the similar apps are also word games and they are
likely to show high visual similarity in internal GUIs as well as
textual descriptions. In such scenarios again it might be useful
to rely on crowdsourcing to obtain an overall assessment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Using a dataset of over 1.2 million app icons, text descrip-
tions, and their executables, we presented the problem of coun-
terfeits in mobile app markets. We proposed an icon encoding
method that allows to efficiently search potential counterfeits
to a given app, using neural embeddings generated by a state-
of-the-art convolutional neural network. More specifically, for
app counterfeit detection problem, we showed that content and
style neural embeddings generated from pre-trained VGGNet
significantly outperforms hashing and feature-based image
retrieval methods. We also showed that adding the text em-
beddings generated from the app descriptions further increase
counterfeit detection rates.
To investigate the depth of the app counterfeit problem
in Google Play Store, we used our multi-modal embedding
methodology to retrieve potential counterfeits for the top-
10,000 popular apps and investigated the possible inclusion of
malware, permission usage, and embedded third party adver-
tisement libraries. We found that 2,040 potential counterfeits
we retrieved were marked by at least five commercial antivirus
tools as malware, 1,565 asked for at least five additional
dangerous permissions, and 1,407 had at least five additional
embedded third party advertisement libraries.
Finally, we showed that after 6-10 months since we dis-
covered the apps, 27%–46% of the potential counterfeits we
identified are not available in Google Play Store, potentially
removed due to customer complaints or post publication
findings. This is an indication that our proposed method is
effective in identifying counterfeits at an early stage. We also
showed that some of these apps are downloaded thousands of
times before they are taken down. To sum up, our proposed
multi-modal neural embedding approach allows to efficiently
and effectively identify whether an app submitted by developer
is trying counterfeit an existing popular app during the app
publication process.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we describe additional experiments we
conducted to evaluate the effect of using different pre-trained
models, convolutional layers, and kernel functions to transform
the feature space. In summary, our results are consistent and
show the benefit of using style embeddings. Different layers
and architectures show minor variations among themselves,
however, none of them stands out as significantly better
compared to others.
A. Appendix I
We used three different CNN architectures to compare
the performance of neural embeddings; VGG19, VGG16 and
ResNet50. We used the last fully connected layers (fc_7)
C ∈ R4096 of VGG19, VGG16 and the final average pooling
layer (avg_pool) C ∈ R2048 of ResNet50 as the content
representations. To represent style, we tested and compared ten
different convolution layer outputs of the three architectures.
We considered the fifth convolution stage of each architecture
to extract the Gram matrices. Extracted Gram matrices were
reduced to S ∈ R4096 using very sparse random projection.
Details such as the kernel size, number of channels, and stride
of the convolution layers used to extract Gram matrices for
each architecture are shown in Table A.1.
In Table A.2 and Table A.3, we present the results. Overall,
performances of all architectures and the convolutional layers
are approximately similar. Following high level observations
can be made based on our results.
• In all four datasets, ResNet50 outperforms other two
architectures in representing the content of app icons.
For example, for all four k-NN scenarios, the content
embeddings have approximately 1%–3% and 3%–6%
higher performance in precision@k and recall@k in all
apps dataset compared to other content representations.
• Best performances for style representation vary among
different layers of the three architectures for different
datasets. For example, ResNet50 conv5_1 shows the
best performance for labelled set while VGG16 conv5_2
shows the best performance for UKBench dataset for
all k-NN scenarios outperforming other architectures by
small margins.
• For all apps dataset, VGG19 conv5_1 outperforms the
rest for 10-NN and 15-NN scenarios while VGG16
conv5_1 shows the best performance for 5-NN and 20-
NN (approximately 0.01%–1% higher performance in
precision@k and recall@k than other architectures).
B. Appendix II
We next analyse the effect of transforming the Gram matrix
into a different space. Earlier we used the style embeddings of
the final convolution layer outputs of the VGG19 architecture
and use the cosine distance to measure the similarity between
the icons in the feature space. This approach might have a
drawback, that there may be no degree of freedom available
to tune the feature space specifically for the application, in
Layer Kernel
Size
No. of
Channels
Stride Padding Activation
VGG19 conv5_1 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG19 conv5_2 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG19 conv5_3 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG19 conv5_4 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG16 conv5_1 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG16 conv5_2 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
VGG16 conv5_3 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
ResNet50 conv5_1 1x1 512 (2,2) Valid ReLU
ResNet50 conv5_2 3x3 512 (1,1) Same ReLU
ResNet50 conv5_3 1x1 2,048 (2,2) Valid -
TABLE A.1: Convolution layer configurations
Note: ResNet50 conv5_3 does not have its own activation function as
the output of conv5_3 is added with a modified input tensor of the fifth
convolution block before passing through a ReLU activation.
this case the similarity of the icons. Hence, we transform the
feature space into different kernel spaces, using parameterised
kernel functions. This allows us to tune the hyper-parameters
of the space to uniquely design a metric for our application.
We experiment with polynomial kernel, squared exponential
kernel [61], and shifting the feature values to introduce a
bias [60]. The kernel transformations are given bellow.
POLY (a, b)(G) = (GGT + a)b (6)
SHIFT (c)(F ) = (F + c)(F + c)T (7)
SquaredExp(d)(G) = exp(
G
d ) (8)
Here, G is the gram matrix and F is the corresponding
feature set. a, b are the bias and polynomial coefficient of
the polynomial kernel respectively. Parameter c is the shifting
bias of the SHIFT (c) function, and d is the variance of
the Squared Exponential kernel.We show our results for the
UKBench and Labelled Dataset in Table B.1 and Table B.2,
respectively. We make the following high level observations
from our results
• All three kernels performance is almost similar to the
perceptual loss on feature space.
• Shifting the features by 1, gives a small gain in retrieval
rates. However, smaller or larger values tends to decrease
the performance. For example SHIFT(1) gives 81.25%
recall@5 value, while SHIFT(0.1) gives 81.27% and
SHIFT(10) gives 81.02% on UKBench dataset. There-
fore, it is necessary to find optimal values for the kernel
hyper-parameters.
• Polynomial and Squared Exponential kernels are more
sensitive to the parameter selection. For Polynomial ker-
nel, the power parameter is highly significant, as we
can see from Table B.1 and Table B.2. For instance,
POLY(x,2) has very low recall and precision compared
to POLY(x,1). Further, the Exponential kernel has similar
trends as SHIFT kernel, with respect to standard devia-
tion, i.e. performance drops at lower and larger values
of standard deviation. For example SquaredExp(1000)
gives 82.24% recall@5 value, while SquaredExp(100)
and SquaredExp(10000) gives 35.96% and 73.32% re-
spectively.
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Content Style
VGG19 VGG16 ResNet50 VGG19 VGG16 ResNet50
conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3 conv5_4 conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3 conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3
5-NN 46.36 46.96 48.60 46.72 46.92 47.12 44.28 47.16 46.88 45.36 47.92 46.68 48.00
10-NN 25.28 25.68 26.60 25.24 25.16 25.34 24.24 25.46 25.24 24.70 25.84 25.50 25.86
15-NN 17.47 17.67 18.15 17.25 17.24 17.28 16.71 17.49 17.39 17.09 17.67 17.43 17.64
H
ol
id
ay
s
20-NN 13.31 13.43 13.77 13.13 13.18 13.17 12.83 13.33 13.28 13.02 13.47 13.28 13.51
5-NN 70.22 71.00 75.02 65.02 69.68 71.40 68.58 69.70 71.90 69.51 70.92 68.29 70.25
10-NN 36.90 37.02 38.67 33.86 36.12 36.91 36.13 36.20 37.26 36.37 36.84 35.69 36.56
15-NN 25.03 25.06 25.97 22.95 24.41 24.93 24.60 24.51 25.13 24.73 24.91 24.17 24.77
U
K
B
en
ch
20-NN 18.97 18.97 19.58 17.40 18.47 18.87 18.66 18.52 18.97 18.77 18.86 18.30 18.73
5-NN 56.43 57.17 60.85 60.57 60.22 59.30 55.61 60.20 60.28 56.20 60.67 59.85 60.37
10-NN 33.69 33.78 35.87 35.84 35.45 34.81 32.56 35.48 35.16 32.76 35.89 35.09 35.45
15-NN 24.05 24.09 25.49 25.45 25.12 24.81 23.22 25.16 24.90 23.34 25.53 25.03 25.05
L
ab
el
le
d
20-NN 18.69 18.81 19.84 19.75 19.47 19.23 18.18 19.53 19.39 18.16 19.94 19.53 19.58
5-NN 45.66 45.06 48.54 50.67 50.52 49.77 44.59 51.07 50.30 44.69 50.49 49.35 49.58
10-NN 26.08 25.88 28.29 29.65 29.29 28.83 25.38 29.58 29.22 25.66 29.45 28.33 28.60
A
ll
15-NN 18.35 18.26 20.12 21.00 20.79 20.40 17.94 20.91 20.58 18.03 20.86 20.12 20.48
20-NN 14.18 14.16 15.62 16.15 16.05 15.76 13.83 16.18 15.87 13.89 16.12 15.68 15.88
TABLE A.2: Precision@k for all test scenarios (NN* - Nearest Neighbours)
Content Style
VGG19 VGG16 ResNet50 VGG19 VGG16 ResNet50
conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3 conv5_4 conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3 conv5_1 conv5_2 conv5_3
5-NN 77.73 78.74 81.49 78.34 78.67 79.01 74.25 79.07 78.60 76.06 80.35 78.27 80.48
10-NN 84.78 86.12 89.20 84.64 84.37 84.98 81.29 85.38 84.64 82.83 86.65 85.51 86.72
15-NN 87.86 88.87 91.28 86.79 86.72 86.92 84.04 87.99 87.46 85.98 88.87 87.66 88.73
H
ol
id
ay
s
20-NN 89.27 90.07 92.35 88.06 88.40 88.33 86.05 89.40 89.07 87.32 90.34 89.07 90.61
5-NN 87.78 88.75 93.78 81.27 87.10 89.25 85.73 87.13 89.87 86.89 88.65 85.36 87.81
10-NN 92.25 92.55 96.67 84.65 90.31 92.27 90.32 90.50 93.16 90.92 92.10 89.22 91.41
15-NN 93.85 93.99 97.38 86.08 91.52 93.47 92.24 91.91 94.22 92.72 93.41 90.65 92.87
U
K
B
en
ch
20-NN 94.83 94.86 97.91 86.98 92.34 94.35 93.30 92.59 94.86 93.83 94.29 91.49 93.65
5-NN 64.26 65.10 69.29 68.97 68.58 67.53 63.32 68.55 68.64 64.00 69.09 68.15 68.75
10-NN 76.72 76.94 81.69 81.63 80.73 79.29 74.15 80.81 80.08 74.60 81.75 79.91 80.73
15-NN 82.17 82.31 87.09 86.95 85.82 84.74 79.32 85.96 85.08 79.74 87.20 85.50 85.59
L
ab
el
le
d
20-NN 85.14 85.67 90.39 89.94 88.70 87.57 82.82 88.98 88.30 82.71 90.82 88.98 89.18
5-NN 51.99 51.31 55.27 57.70 57.53 56.68 50.78 58.15 57.28 50.89 57.50 56.20 56.46
10-NN 59.40 58.94 64.42 67.53 66.71 65.67 57.81 67.36 66.54 58.43 67.08 64.51 65.13
A
ll
15-NN 62.70 62.39 68.72 71.74 71.01 69.68 61.29 71.43 70.30 61.60 71.26 68.72 69.96
20-NN 64.59 64.48 71.15 73.58 73.10 71.77 63.01 73.72 72.28 63.27 73.44 71.40 72.34
TABLE A.3: Recall@k for all test scenarios (NN* - Nearest Neighbours)
Kernel Recall@k Precision@k5-
NN
10-
NN
15-
NN
20-
NN
5-
NN
10-
NN
15-
NN
20-
NN
Perceptual loss 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(0,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(0,2) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
POLY(0.1,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(0.5,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(1,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(-0.1,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(-0.5,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(-1,1) 81.27 84.65 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.86 22.95 17.40
POLY(1,2) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
POLY(-1,2) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
SHIFT(0.1) 81.27 84.63 86.08 86.98 65.02 33.85 22.95 17.40
SHIFT(0.2) 81.27 84.62 86.07 86.97 65.02 33.85 22.95 17.39
SHIFT(0.5) 81.27 84.64 86.06 86.96 65.02 33.85 22.95 17.39
SHIFT(1) 81.25 84.59 86.03 86.90 65.00 33.84 22.94 17.38
SHIFT(2) 81.22 84.58 86.01 86.88 64.97 33.83 22.94 17.38
SHIFT(5) 81.11 84.60 85.82 86.74 64.89 33.84 22.89 17.35
SHIFT(10) 81.02 84.44 85.66 86.41 64.82 33.78 22.84 17.28
SHIFT(15) 80.69 84.23 85.45 86.21 64.55 33.69 22.79 17.24
SHIFT(20) 80.39 83.83 85.19 86.07 64.31 33.53 22.72 17.21
SquaredExp(1) 25.89 26.28 26.59 26.81 20.71 10.51 7.09 5.36
SquaredExp(10) 25.78 26.86 27.48 27.77 20.63 10.75 7.33 5.55
SquaredExp(100) 35.96 37.78 38.57 39.06 28.77 15.11 10.28 7.81
SquaredExp(500) 80.52 84.36 86.05 87.20 64.42 33.75 22.95 17.44
SquaredExp(1000) 82.24 85.80 87.30 88.28 65.79 34.32 23.28 17.66
SquaredExp(2000) 78.52 81.91 83.28 84.30 62.82 32.76 22.21 16.86
SquaredExp(5000) 74.57 77.57 79.09 80.02 59.65 31.03 21.09 16.00
SquaredExp(10000) 73.32 76.35 77.87 78.78 58.66 30.54 20.77 15.76
SquaredExp(20000) 64.03 68.48 70.64 72.12 51.22 27.39 18.84 14.42
TABLE B.1: Performance of kernel functions - UKBench
Note: Results are based on the style embeddings from VGG19 conv5_1.
Kernel Recall@k Precision@k5-
NN
10-
NN
15-
NN
20-
NN
5-
NN
10-
NN
15-
NN
20-
NN
Perceptual loss 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(0,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(0,2) 0.14 0.28 0.42 0.57 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
POLY(0.1,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(0.5,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(1,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(-0.1,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(-0.5,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(-1,1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
POLY(1,2) 0.14 0.28 0.42 0.57 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
POLY(-1,2) 0.14 0.28 0.42 0.57 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
SHIFT(0.1) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
SHIFT(0.2) 68.97 81.63 86.95 89.94 60.57 35.84 25.45 19.75
SHIFT(0.5) 68.97 81.58 87.00 89.94 60.57 35.82 25.47 19.75
SHIFT(1) 69.03 81.61 87.03 89.94 60.62 35.83 25.48 19.75
SHIFT(2) 69.03 81.58 86.97 89.94 60.62 35.82 25.46 19.75
SHIFT(5) 68.95 81.52 87.00 89.94 60.55 35.79 25.47 19.75
SHIFT(10) 68.95 81.63 86.97 90.19 60.55 35.84 25.46 19.80
SHIFT(15) 68.86 81.63 87.06 90.19 60.47 35.84 25.48 19.80
SHIFT(20) 68.66 81.66 87.03 90.08 60.30 35.86 25.48 19.78
SquaredExp(1) 27.15 28.34 29.19 29.75 23.85 12.44 8.54 6.53
SquaredExp(10) 34.47 38.12 39.67 40.58 30.27 16.74 11.61 8.91
SquaredExp(100) 43.23 48.88 51.31 52.78 37.97 21.46 15.02 11.59
SquaredExp(500) 59.42 69.51 74.82 78.16 52.18 30.52 21.90 17.16
SquaredExp(1000) 67.62 80.19 85.50 89.09 59.38 35.21 25.03 19.56
SquaredExp(2000) 67.28 79.71 85.25 88.39 59.08 35.00 24.95 19.40
SquaredExp(5000) 65.19 76.72 81.72 84.49 57.25 33.68 23.92 18.55
SquaredExp(10000) 63.44 74.57 79.34 81.92 55.71 32.74 23.23 17.98
SquaredExp(20000) 62.76 73.27 78.07 80.79 55.11 32.17 22.85 17.74
TABLE B.2: Performance of kernel functions - Labelled
Note: Results are based on the style embeddings from VGG19 conv5_1.
